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I. INTRODUCTION
What does it mean when we say someone has "paid his or her
debt to society?" Most people equate this statement with the commer-
cial event of extinguishing with finality a liability or obligation. Yet,
somehow that same phrase carries a far different meaning in Florida
jurisprudence.' Less than two decades after the landmark Brown v.
Board of Education2 decision, Florida re-drafted its constitution but
did not disturb the antiquated provisions aimed at making certain citi-
zens invisible to the political process.
In Johnson v. Bush, et al. ,3 plaintiffs sued on behalf of all Flor-
ida citizens convicted of felonies who had completed all terms of incar-
* Representative, District 59, Florida House of Representatives. Partner, Joyner &
Jordan-Holmes, P.A., Tampa, Florida. B.S., Florida A&M University, 1964. J.D., Florida
A&M University College of Law, 1968. I wish to sincerely thank Charles M. Holloman II,
J.D., Florida A&M University College of Law, 2005, for his legal research, able advice, criti-
ques, and valuable assistance.
1. Florida is one of only five states (AL, FL, IA, KY, VA) that disenfranchise all ex-
felons even after completion of punishment. United States disenfranchisement policies are
harsh and deeply rooted in the legal framework of society. Florida's provision has been
enshrined in the state constitution since Reconstruction and, like all others, is based on the
medieval times principle of "civil death" - the deprivation of all rights to people convicted of
a felony. See Marc Mauer, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Policy Whose Time Has Passed?,
HuMAN RIGHTS, 31 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTs. RESP. 1.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Author's note: Brown I held that segregated public schools
("separate, but equal") were unconstitutional and a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Presently, the struggle for equal protection under
the law continues in the midst of recurring de jure disenfranchisement.
3. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
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ceration or probation yet remained ineligible to vote. 4 They alleged a
myriad of United States Constitution and Code violations. 5 The South-
ern District Court of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendant (Clemency Board members). Among other holdings of
the district court case discussed herein, this article will focus attention
to the holding most adverse to the plaintiffs' principal assertion and to
the subsequent effects - that "exclusion of ex-felons from [sic] voting
did not violate Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses."
6
Of particular importance are the future legal implications this
controversial issue bears upon the law, relative to civil rights and con-
cerning citizens who happen to be convicted felons. Considering felony
disenfranchisement, the line between guaranteed constitutional pro-
tected franchise and sovereign governmental power to determine the
coverage of those protected rights is, at best, tenuous. It seems the
appellate order for rehearing, which vacated the preceding panel's
opinion,7 thereby decreed that a comprehensive examination must be
undertaken to determine whether the disenfranchisement provision in
Florida's Constitution of 1968 "conformed to [the] Equal Protection
Clause."8
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
Almost a century and one-half ago, Congress enacted a well-
known addition to the United States Constitution prohibiting State
laws that abridge any United States citizens' privileges or immuni-
ties.9 It further declares: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 10
How might Florida's constitutional provisions revoking the vot-
ing franchise of all persons convicted of a felony inflict no violence upon
such clear Constitutional language, notwithstanding successful com-
4. Id. at 1335.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1338. (citing Supreme Court' case Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24
(1974)).
7. Johnson v. Governor of the State of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
8. Johnson v. Governor of the State of Fla., 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004) (which is
the nucleus of this article. As such, the legal discussion contained herein is an analysis of
the impact this case and related cases are making within the context of felony
disenfranchisement jurisprudence and civil rights restoration).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
10. Id.
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pletion by the ex-felons of all probation or terms of incarceration? An
inquiry into the statutory derivation and history is illuminating.
A. Florida Disenfranchisement Impact Compared
to the National Impact
The current Florida constitutional disenfranchisement provi-
sion states "[nIo person convicted of a felony, or adjudicated in this or
any other state to be mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote or
hold office until restoration of civil rights or removal of disability."11 A
felony means "any criminal offense that is punishable under the laws
of this state . . . by death or by imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary."12 Any person desirous of registering to vote in Florida must
qualify based on requirements cited in the Florida Voter Registration
Act. 13 Most notably, felony convicts who have not had their rights to
vote restored are summarily written out of the statute and categorized
as unqualified registrants.' 4 Therefore, ex-convicts similarly situated
to the Johnson plaintiffs must apply for civil rights restoration via ex-
ecutive clemency in order to meet the voting requirements. 5 Consid-
ering the cumbersome and expensive nature of the clemency process,
undoubtedly many applicants are deterred from the outset when faced
with only the mere possibility that their civil rights will be restored.' 6
Historically, Florida's law effectively disenfranchised an esti-
mated 647,000 ex-felons, of which 204,000 are African-American
men.' 7 In essence, more than thirty-one percent (31%) of the total esti-
11. FLA. CONST. art. VI § 4(a) (1968) (Disqualifications). The earliest constitution
contained the original disenfranchisement provision, See FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 13
(1838). Thereafter, the constitution was re-drafted four times (1861, 1865, 1868, and 1885)
before the current version was enacted. However, the disenfranchisement provision
remains essentially intact.
12. FLA. CONST. art. X § 10.
13. FLA. STAT. § 97.041.
14. § 97.041(2)(b).
15. FLA. STAT. § 940.03. Interestingly the statute may require an applicant to provide
a copy of the clemency application to the judge and prosecuting attorney of the court that
convicted him or her. The Clemency Board, although only comprised of the Governor and
two Cabinet members, "will consider letters in support of, or opposition to, the grant of
executive clemency" (emphasis added). See Information and Instructions on Applying for
Restoration of Civil Rights.
16. FLA. STAT. § 940.05 reveals that ex-felons "may be entitled to restoration of all civil
rights of citizenship" if they have "received a full pardon, served the maximum term of the
sentence imposed, or been granted... final release by the Parole Commission" (emphasis
added).
17. See, e.g., Jamie Fellner & Marc Mauer, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, Human Rights Watch and The Sentencing
Project (1998), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/ndex.; Patricia Allard and
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mated population of ex-felons disenfranchised in Florida are African-
American males. The national perspective is more of the same. An
estimated 4.6 million Americans - roughly 1 in 50 adults - are barred
from voting because of a felony conviction."' American laws 'that bar
ex-felons from exercising their voting franchise disproportionately af-
fect minority communities nationwide as more than 1.4 million Afri-
can-American men (13%) are disenfranchised - a rate almost, seven
times the national average of just over (2%) for all other adults. 19
Given current rates of incarceration, 3 in 10 African-American men in
the next generation will be disenfranchised at some point during their
lifetimes. 20 As a result, Florida's population of disenfranchised ex-
felons, who are also African-American males, more than doubles the
already disproportionate national minority rate.
B. Beacham and Johnson - Birds of a Feather
In Johnson, the district court maintains that the plaintiffs'
equal protection argument flew into the face of clear precedent estab-
lished both by the United States Supreme Court and the sitting
court.21 The Honorable James Lawrence King, District Judge, relied
primarily upon the holding in Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182
(S.D. Fla.1969),22 which was set forth more than thirty years prior to
the date of his ruling. Five months following the district court ruling
in Beacham, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion affirming
the Beacham ruling.23 With little variance of fact the Johnson and
Beacham cases presented the judicial system with the age-old question
of whether a state may constitutionally exclude from the franchise per-
Marc Mauer, Regaining the Vote: An Assessment of Activity Relating to Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws, The Sentencing Project (Jan. 2000).
18. Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, The Political Consequences of Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, 67 AM. Soc. REV., 2002, 777-803 (earlier
version of paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association,
Washington, DC, Aug. 16, 2000), available at http://www.sentencingproject.orgpdfs/
UggenManza.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. § 701(b)(1)(K) (2005), available
at http://www.pfaw.orgpfaw/dfiles/file-493.pdf.
21. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38.
22. The three-judge district court held that a "state may constitutionally exclude from
the franchise persons otherwise qualified to vote who have been convicted of a felony" does
not constitute denial of equal protection or due process "for the governor, with approval of
three members of his cabinet, to restore discretionarily the right to vote to some felons and
not to others." Id. at 184.
23. Beacham v. Braterman, 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
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sons otherwise qualified to vote who have been convicted of a felony.24
Notably, the Beacham court acknowledged the current absence of Su-
preme Court resolve on this "precise issue" and instead sought direc-
tion from a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case.25 Due partially to
the affirmation from the Supreme Court on the paramount question in
Beacham, the Johnson court adopted its ruling as binding precedent. 2
6
With the added weight of Johnson, the tradition of felony disen-
franchisement continued to gain momentum.
In New York, two years earlier than Beacham, the Second Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Green proved to be persuasive enough for the
Beacham court to follow. 27 Despite the vast contrast between propri-
ety and established law, Judge King, writing interpretatively of the
Beacham holding, concludes the disenfranchisement provision of Flor-
ida's 1968 Constitution violates neither the Equal Protection Clause
nor the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 28
Hence, based on Beacham, foreclosure is made of the plaintiffs' due
process claims by the judicial decree granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment without any dissent. 29 To be sure, the court
went further in Johnson to validate Florida's disenfranchisement law
as not enacted with racially discriminatory motives. 30 As will be un-
derscored later, whether such law is predicated upon impermissible
discriminatory intent is an evidentiary inquiry into "circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available."31
C. Richardson Turns Propriety into Precedent
California's Supreme Court decided the issue of felony disen-
franchisement to the contrary in a factually similar case involving
three convicted felons who had completed their sentences and pa-
roles. 32 Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then re-
versed, remanding the prior ruling, to wit, that disenfranchisement of
24. Beacham, 300 F. Supp. at 183.
25. Id. at 184 (citing Green v. Bd. of Elections of the City of New York, 380 F.2d 445
(2nd Cir.1967), 389 U.S. 1048 (1968)).
26. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
27. See, Green, 380 F.2d at 451 ("[Tlhe propriety of excluding felons has been so
frequently recognized - indeed put forward by Justices to illustrate what the states may
properly do - that such expressions may not be rejected as unconsidered dicta.").
28. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (citing Beacham, 396 U.S. at 12).
29. Id. at 1333.
30. Id.
31. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
32. See Ramirez v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199 (1973).
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convicted felons who had completed their sentences and paroles did not
deny equal protection.33 However, not all of the Justices agreed with
Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Two followed the dissenting Justice Mar-
shall.34 The Johnson court used the Richardson case to augment the
strength of the Beacham decision in order to reach its conclusion that
felony disenfranchisement law does not violate the Constitution,
neither under equal protection nor due process claims.
35
Not until the Richardson decision was rendered had the Court
given "plenary consideration" to the constitutional question presented
by the Johnson plaintiffs. 36 Rather than rely on res judicata, which
obviously could not be done, the Court instead recounts a couple of
cases decided at the close of the 19th century that collectively comprise
the framework for its ruling in Richardson.37 The Court's formula for
what it calls "settled historical and judicial understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment's effect of state laws disenfranchising convicted
felons"38 also includes its own dicta from an opinion upholding the im-
position of North Carolina's literacy requirement for voting.39 In addi-
tion to the Beacham holding, the Richardson court points to two
district court cases which were summarily affirmed that attack state
disenfranchisement laws targeted at convicted felons.40 Finally, the
Court points out that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment affirma-
tively sanctions excluding felons from voting.
41
Having considered the aforementioned cases, the United States
Supreme Court in Richardson found the California Supreme Court
erred by concluding that California may no longer, "consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, exclude from
33. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
34. Id. Justice Marshall, dissenting, states that this ruling allows a "State [to] strip ex-
felons who have fully paid their debt to society of their fundamental right to vote without
running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment" and is grounded "on an unsound historical
analysis which has already been rejected by this Court." Id. at 56.
35. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1338.
36. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53.
37. Id. See, Marphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890) (upholding disenfranchisement of bigamists and polygamists under [state] territorial
laws). (Overruled on other grounds by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
38. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
39. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959)).
40. Id. at 53 (citing Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1973), affd, 411 U.S.
961; Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969), affd, 396 U.S. 12)).
41. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54. This is the central assertion of dissenting Circuit Judge
Kravitch in Johnson. He writes, citing Richardson, "[Tihe text of the Fourteenth
Amendment explicitly allows states to disenfranchise convicted felons... and the Supreme
Court unambiguously has determined [disenfranchisement] is not an Equal Protection
violation." Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1307.
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the franchise convicted felons" who have paid their debts to society.42
As such, the decision was reversed, but also remanded for the Califor-
nia Supreme Court to address the respondents' (Ramirez, et. al.) alter-
native contention. 43 In addition to disagreement with the equal
protection issue, Justice Marshall believed the Court was without
proper jurisdiction.44
D. Impermissible Discriminatory Intent?
Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama contain like disenfranchise-
ment provisions whose original enactment birthdays are less than a
quarter of a century apart in their respective state constitutions. 45
Only by overlooking the states of Nevada, Wyoming, and Indiana, as
well as Kentucky and Virginia (southern states that are not truly con-
sidered "Deep South"), may the quick assumption be made that be-
cause the South seemingly preserved slavery longer than the North, to
the point of the Civil War, therefore logic compels the conclusion that
disenfranchisement laws are borne of the South. Despite deeply rooted
Southern vestiges of de jure discrimination and segregation, the fact
that minorities are and have been disenfranchised for years across the
nation, even in the Midwest states, forecloses that hypothesis.
The plaintiffs in Johnson presented a plethora of historical evi-
dence chronicling Florida's disenfranchisement scheme in support of
their contention "that race was a substantial and motivating factor"
and "that the policy was originally enacted in 1838 and reenacted in
1868 with the particular discriminatory purpose of keeping [B]lacks
from voting."46 The appellate court considered a Supreme Court ruling
that found Alabama's Constitutional disenfranchisement provision
42. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56.
43. Id. Respondents averred a "total'lack of uniformity in .. .election officials'
enforcement of the disenfranchisement laws as to work a separate denial of equal
protection." Id.
44. Id. at 63 (arguing, "I believe that the judgment of the California court was based on
adequate and independent state grounds, I do not think we have jurisdiction to consider any
other issues presented by this case").
45. FLA. CONST. art. VI § 4 (1838); Miss. CONST. art. XII, § 241 (1890); ALA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 182 (1901).
46. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1295 (referring to the evidence excluded in district court).
Apparently, the Plaintiffs' evidence, an expert report and testimony from Dr. Jerome
Shofner (one of Florida's leading historians of the Reconstruction era and publisher of two
scholarly works analyzing the 1868 constitutional convention), was adequate enough that a
"reasonable fact-finder could" ascertain a threshold showing. Id. at 1296-97 (emphasis
added). Possibly because Dr. Shofiner unequivocally concluded "that intentional racial
discrimination had motivated the.., criminal disenfranchisement provisions as passed in
1868." Id. at 1296. Interestingly, the appellate court, despite its tenor seemingly in favor of
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was "motivated by racially discriminatory intent, [and] would not have
been enacted.., without the racially discriminatory intent, and there-
fore violated the Equal Protection Clause."47 Albeit brief, the appellate
court also considered a Mississippi case that addressed the issue of
subsequent amendments and reenactments purging a racially moti-
vated provision.
48
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs'
showing of racial animus and discriminatory intent behind the original
1868 felony disenfranchisement enactment is sufficient to create a gen-
uine issue of material fact and satisfies their initial burden to prove an
equal protection violation. 49 Furthermore, if such impermissible in-
tent is found to exist, it continues through the 1968 enactment unless
the State shows the provision would have been enacted with "an inde-
pendent, non-discriminatory purpose."50 In short, the State must then
carry the burden of showing that it "knowingly and deliberately reen-
acted the provision for [a] non-discriminatory reason in order to prove
[the] 1968 provision conformed to [the] Equal Protection Clause."
51
Therefore, the appellate court found the district court's summary judg-
ment ruling was improperly granted with respect to the equal protec-
tion claim. 5
2
The Eleventh Circuit in Johnson went so far as to recognize the
obvious vestiges of impermissible racial discrimination that pervaded
the enactment of Florida's 1868 disenfranchisement law. However, the
2004 appellate court balked at the opportunity to affirmatively declare
that racial animus was a motivating factor behind the 1868 enactment.
Opting rather to reverse the order on grounds that summary judgment
the Plaintiffs' equal protection violation claim, subsequently framed the holding with "if,
then" language. Id. at 1287.
47. Id. at 1296-97; Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). In the district court, the
Plaintiffs cited Hunter in support of their claim that felony disenfranchisement violates the
Equal Protection Clause. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1338.
48. Johnson, 353 F. 3d at 1300. (See Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that "subsequent amendments and reenactments of a [disenfranchisement]
provision removed discriminatory taint of original version adopted for purpose of
discriminating against [B]lacks")). The district court in Johnson relied on this reasoning to
conclude Florida's 1968 Constitution reenacting the felony disenfranchisement law
"cleansed Florida[ I ... of any invidious discriminatory purpose that may have prompted its
inception in Florida's 1868 Constitution." Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1339.
49. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1301-02.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1287. See also, Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227-28 (applying the approach set forth
in Arlington Heights, see supra note 31).
52. Id. at 1302.
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was improper, the question remains "whether such provision was reen-
acted in 1968 with independent, non-discriminatory intent."
53
III. THE JOHNSON CONJECTURE
Plaintiff Thomas Johnson along with five other African Ameri-
cans, one Hispanic, and one Caucasian filed suit on behalf of all
Floridians convicted of felonious crimes who have completed their
terms of incarceration or probation, yet remain ineligible to vote based
on state law. 54 Neither of the plaintiffs had successfully restored their
civil rights to become eligible to vote in Florida at the time the litiga-
tion in this case commenced. 55 Upon completion of his own terms pur-
suant to a felony conviction in New York, Mr. Johnson, then fifty-one
(51) years old, became executive director of a Christian organization in
Gainesville, Florida devoted to assisting newly released offenders with
residential needs. 56 The case came about before the Southern District
court on challenge to Florida's disenfranchisement law, whereupon
cross-motions for summary judgment were made and arguments heard
in support of both motions.57 District Court Judge James Lawrence
King excluded certain expert testimony58 en route to granting the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment with prejudice. 59 Plaintiffs, in
turn, appealed.
Procedurally, the grant of summary judgment was reviewed de
novo using identical legal standards as were applied by the district
court.60 The plaintiffs essentially claimed on appeal that the "intent of
the 1868 framers remains operative" within Florida's disenfranchise-
ment law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.61 As previously
53. Id. at 1287.
54. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1335.
55. Id. See supra note 14 for Florida statute regarding voter registration
qualifications. See also FLA. STAT. § 940.05 (Restoration of civil rights).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1334-35. Plaintiffs sued members of Florida's Clemency Board in their
official capacity. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1292.
58. See supra note 46 regarding Dr. Jerome Shofner. Judge King states that Plaintiffs
"at most have presented evidence to suggest that Florida's felon disenfranchisement policies
were racially motivated in 1868 . . . they have not presented any evidence that the
legislature that enacted the felon disenfranchisement provision in 1968 did so to
discriminate against African Americans." In brief, the judge asserts that the legislature
"significantly deliberated and substantially revised" Florida's 1868 provision effectually
cleansing it of any original taint.
59. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1343-44.
60. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1292.
61. Id. at 1293.
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noted, the appellate court acknowledged the presence of disputed is-
sues of fact to be settled on the equal protection and voting rights
claim. Using the lower court's summary judgment record as a
roadmap, the court opined, "[T]his case, however, fits neither the
Hunter nor the Richardson model" because the 1868 constitutional
convention "did not have the final word on the disenfranchisement pro-
vision ... [n]or did the provision originate in 1968."62 Thus, the court
was faced with a quandary of legal sorts and seemed unsure as to how
to definitively decide the issue in light of the positions argued by both
sides.
The plaintiffs asserted that because impermissible intent was a
motivating factor in the 1868 enactment, the burden of proving that
the later reenactment was predicated on "legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory" grounds rests with the State.63 The defendants retorted, claim-
ing that the State bears no burden in this regard. Further, the State
contended that "the original provision has no legal effect" due to the
subsequent reenactment.64 In addressing the arguments proffered by
the litigants, the court analyzed a line of cases concerning the legality
of race-neutral policies tending to maintain intentional racial discrimi-
nation in other arenas such as de jure segregation. 65 The findings of
those cases are most favorable to the Plaintiffs because where discrimi-
natory intent is demonstrated to have existed the State must "show the
original taint has been purged."
66
The appellate rationale straddles the issue at best, but still
manages to provide a sliver of hope, that familiar spark common to
most revolutionary changes known to mankind. Central to the appel-
late reasoning and inapposite the district court's adherence to the nar-
row view that invidious discriminatory intent is cleansed by later
reenactment of facially neutral provisions,6 7 the principle set forth by
the Fifth Circuit more than ten years before Cotton conjures up a more
vivid picture of the realities of the human experience, in that "[a] law
62. Id. at 1297. On the one hand, applying Hunter, the provision violates the Equal
Protection Clause, because the defendants have not established as a matter of law "that the
constitutional convention would have passed the felon disenfranchisement provision in 1868
absent a racially impermissible purpose." In contrast, applying Richardson, the provision is
not per se unconstitutional because there is no evidence "that racial considerations were
discussed by the participants in the 1968 constitutional revision process." Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1297.
66. Id.
67. See Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1339 (citing Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391), and note 46
comments, supra.
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may be infected by discriminatory intent at any stage, including a later
reenactment."68 To be sure, the appellate court in Johnson, makes the
crystal even clearer that intervening circumstances, standing alone,
are insufficient to break the causal chain thus eroding the poison of
original impermissibility. 69
The divide between the sitting courts in Johnson is obvious by
their respective holdings. The district court's doubtless stance that
Florida's "disenfranchisement law was not enacted for racially discrim-
inatory motives" 70 differs with the appellate conclusion that the de-
fendants failed to show that the 1868 provision would have been
enacted at that time absent the impermissible discriminatory intent. 71
The split between courts is further widened by the stance each took on
the amount and style of scrutiny given to the disenfranchisement pro-
vision by the 1968 Constitutional Revision Committee (CRC). Judge
King's determination at the district level was that "the record sur-
rounding the reenactment of Florida's felony disenfranchisement pro-
vision in 1968 clearly indicates that significant deliberations and
substantive changes were made by the Florida legislature .... 72 Dis-
tinctively, the appellate court found the provision "remained substan-
tively unchanged," although there were "certain textual modifications"
during the revision process.73 Where the district court foreclosed the
Plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the Eleventh Circuit Appeals court in
2004 decided to leave the door ajar as to whether Florida's longstand-
ing disenfranchisement provision conforms to Constitutional man-
68. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1295 (citing McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239,
1246 (5th Cir. 1981)).
69. Id. at 1293 (noting that "proof of discriminatory intent behind a specific policy in
the past creates an inference that the impermissible purpose continues into the present,
despite the passage of time and even, in some instances, intervening changes to the policy")
(emphasis added). See also Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233 (observing that despite the contention
that 80 years succeeding the original enactment had legitimated the provision, Alabama's
constitutional disenfranchisement law "was motivated by the desire to discriminate against
blacks on account of race and the section continues to this day to have that effect. As such,
it violates equal protection under Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270.")
70. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1333.
71. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1301 (based on de novo review of the district court's opinion).
72. Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1339.
73. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1297 (concluding that the record supports only that a
subcommittee "discussed" the provision, "no evidence of the substance of that discussion,
nor that the CRC as whole or the legislature ever discussed the provision. . .one could
equally conclude that the Subcommittee regarded the felon disenfranchisement [law] as a
legacy of previous constitutions that did not need to be revisited in substance." Id. at 1301-
02).
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dates. 74 Perhaps these conflicts which arose in Johnson are the
impetus necessary to forge new laws in observance "that measured
against the standards of ... modern equal protection jurisprudence,
the blanket disenfranchisement of ex-felons cannot stand."75
IV. UNPAID DEBTS
In the first Johnson appellate decision, a panel comprised of one
district and two circuit court judges specifically held that if impermis-
sible discriminatory intent was a motivating factor behind the 1868
enactment of Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision, and such
provision would not have been enacted at that time absent impermissi-
ble discriminatory intent, then Florida had the burden of showing that
the State knowingly and deliberately reenacted the provision for a non-
discriminatory reason, in order to prove that 1968 provision conformed
to Equal Protection Clause.7 6 What seems peculiar is the placement of
the word "if' within this otherwise clear directive for the State. Appar-
ently the judges did not wish to go so far as to proclaim definitively
that the 1868 provision was poisoned with racial animus and, as such,
the revised enactment of 1968 suffers from the same defect. Had they
done so, the only reasonable conclusion would be that Florida's disen-
franchisement law unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Despite all the evidence available to prove that disen-
franchisement of convicted felons is rooted in racism,77 it baffles the
mind how Americans, particularly some policymakers, profess that
once you "pay your debt to society," you may return to the commu-
nity.78 Obviously, no one thought it necessary to inform those con-
74. See supra note 46. The court's essential holding relative to the question of
impermissible discriminatory intent uses conjecture, i.e. "if, then," as a springboard.
75. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1301. See comments in note 46, supra.
77. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56 and comments in note 46, supra. Plaintiffs'
evidence also details the 1868 constitutional convention being controlled by Moderate
Republicans opposed to Black suffrage. Congress required Florida, as a condition of
readmission to the Union, to extend voting rights regardless of race, thus the convention
took place. Once control was wrested from the Radical Republicans, the Moderates
substituted numerous stringent suffrage provisions, namely, the scope of
disenfranchisement from "infamous crimes to all felonies." Thereafter, a Moderate leader
boasted that he had kept Florida from becoming "niggerized." Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1295-96.
78. See Mauer, supra note 1. Author's note: As a policymaker myself, I am keenly
aware of the fact that not every Florida legislator embraces such antiquated notions of law
that would exact the harshness of withholding a citizen's voting franchise. See also S. 132,
107th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (proposed bill creates the Citizens Empowerment Act allowing
a convicted felon to the automatic right to register to vote "restored by operation of law," (1)
year after completion and satisfaction of all sentences imposed). See also, the Count Every
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victed of a felony in states like Florida that completion of all probation,
parole, or terms of incarceration is insufficient for society to clear the
debt. To put it bluntly,. the mere fact that scores of citizens have been
systematically shackled under laws that serve no real rehabilitative
purpose, while being taught that our American democracy represents
the model for global equality, is hypocritical at best.
A. True Democracy
As previously noted, Plaintiffs' evidence from expert witness,
Dr. Shofner, was excluded by the district court, but considered on ap-
peal in 2004. 79 Seemingly, the district court judge relied so heavily on
precedent that he felt precluded from taking judicial notice of historical
evidence from the Reconstruction era that "Florida refused to extend
civil and political rights to [B]lacks immediately following the Civil
War."80 The district court was quite convinced that no racial discrimi-
natory motive pervaded the original enactment of Florida's disen-
franchisement law and the 2004 appellate court followed up with a
hypothetical rather than an unambiguous pronouncement. The hold-
ings of these cases taken together, implicate questions of morality and
true democracy.
As Justice Thurgood Marshall notes, "[d]isenfranchisement for
participation in crime, like durational residency requirements, was
common at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But 'constitutional concepts of equal protection are not immutably fro-
zen like insects trapped in Devonian amber."'81 Given the right to vote
Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by Senators Hillary Rodham
Clinton, Barbara Boxer, and John F. Kerry, proposing creation of the Civic Participation Act
purposed under § 701(b)(2) "to restore fairness in the Federal election process by ensuring
that ex-offenders who have fully served their sentences are not denied the right to vote.") In
March 2005, the Nebraska Legislature repealed the lifetime ban on all felons and replaced
it with a two-year post-sentence ban. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States,
The Sentencing Project, March 2005.
79. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 63.
80. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1295. While slightly acknowledging the evidence proved
racial animus behind the 1868 provision, Judge King's rationale for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs' claim of intentional racial discrimination centered on "significant deliberation
and substantive revision" of the provision. His conclusion that Plaintiffs failed to show
racial intent behind the 1968 enactment lines up with the theory of cleansing (or "purging")
by subsequent reenactments. See Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1340-41.
81. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 76 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dillenburg v.
Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972)) and arguing in favor of declaring
disenfranchisement unconstitutional under the same premise as durational residency
requirements held in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), "[there is no basis for
concluding that Congress intended by Section 2 to freeze the meaning of other clauses of the
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"is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that
right strike at the heart of representative government," America has
repeatedly recognized that voting, like free speech and expression, is a
fundamental right.8 2 Public policy arguments favoring laws that elimi-
nate fundamental civil rights are tenuous where true democratic val-
ues are balanced against longstanding constitutional principles such
as taxation without representation. As Marc Mauer observes, there is
no value in the largely retributive function of disenfranchisement nor
does it serve the goals of incapacitation or deterrence because
"[iindividuals who are not already deterred from crime by the threat of
incarceration are unlikely to be swayed by the prospect of losing their
vote."8
3
To measure disenfranchisement under the requirements of Sec-
tion 1 of the Equal Protection Clause, as Justice Marshall suggests,
means to apply the compelling-state-interest test (balancing individual
interests against state interests).8 4 His point is eloquently spelled out
that "[there is certainly no basis for asserting that ex-felons have any
less interest in the democratic process than any other citizen. Like
everyone else, their daily lives are affected and changed by the deci-
sions of government."8 5 A true democracy is just as, if not more, con-
cerned with making sure every citizen has a voice as it is with
extracting retributive payments to society-payments that should be
honored when remitted in full.
B. An Equitable Approach
Essentially Johnson came up through a vein of case law stacked
against the Plaintiffs, who merely attempted to prove that Florida's
law deprived their fundamental voting franchise. Beacham and Rich-
ardson collectively provided a means by which the Plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection and voting rights claims were sentenced to a "palace of
[inljustice."8 6 The Cotton holding was used to seal the door of the pal-
ace by making any racially discriminatory law subject to reincarnation
once a superseding amendment is enacted.8 7 Thus, Hunter became the
Fourteenth Amendment to the conception of voting rights prevalent at the time of the
adoption of the Amendment.").
82. Id. at 77.
83. See Mauer, supra note 1, at 17.
84. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 77-78.
85. Id.
86. Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., "I Have a Dream" Address at the March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963).
87. Cotton, 157 F.3d at 388.
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only place within the palace for the Plaintiffs to hang their hat; even
though Hunter generally supports the Plaintiffs' assertion for an equal
protection violation, it is not exclusively on their side. The Court in
Hunter remarks, "without deciding whether [the disenfranchisement
provision] would be valid if enacted today without any impermissible
motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was moti-
vated by a desire to discriminate against [B]lacks on account of race
and.. .continues to this day to have that effect [therefore,] it violates
equal protection under Arlington Heights."""
Seemingly, the Johnson court in 2004 was acutely observant of
the insurmountable weight of case law pressing down against the
Plaintiffs' plight, even further exacerbated by the rejection of their ex-
pert testimony. It must have come to mind that a fair equal protection
case must first begin with an equal chance to advance one's claim. As
previously noted, the appellate court ruled that the Defendants failed
to prove the original 1868 constitutional provision would have been en-
acted absent impermissible discriminatory intent.89 Perhaps the
phrasing of the holding, by their choosing the word "if," is indicative of
the court being sympathetic to the legal precedence working against
the Plaintiffs, the denial of relevant expert testimony, plus the failure
to prove non-discriminatory intent by the Defendants. Surely equita-
ble relief is proper where the legal remedy is insufficient to serve the
interests of justice, thereby dismantling the vestiges of inequality that
Florida's disenfranchisement law has perpetuated through racial dis-
crimination since the 19th century. The Roman maxim is apropos,
"[E]quity regards as done that which ought to have been done."
Interestingly, seven months after the appellate court's reversal
of the district opinion, pursuant to a request by a member of the appel-
late court for a poll on the suggestion of a rehearing en banc, a majority
of the judges granted the rehearing.9 0 It is possible the court felt their
decision made the previous December was improperly rendered on a
material issue that could have changed the outcome; it is equally con-
ceivable that the court realized they missed an opportunity to pro-
88. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233. But see Johnson, 214 F. Supp. 2d. at 1333. Notably,
Johnson and Cotton both interpreted the Supreme Court decision in Hunter as leaving open
"the possibility that reenactment may be sufficient in some circumstances to 'break the
causal chain'... ." Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1300-01 (citing Knight v. Alabama, 14 F.3d 1534,
1550 (11th Cir. 1994)). Johnson further states, "[But] we disagree with the Fifth Circuit's
failure to consider whether such reenactment must be accompanied by an independent, non-
discriminatory purpose." Id. at 1301.
89. Johnson, 353 F.3d at 1296.
90. Johnson, 377 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004) (vacating the previous panel's opinion).
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nounce that Florida's felon disenfranchisement law does indeed violate
the Equal Protection Clause.
Notwithstanding the apparent disagreement between the ap-
pellate and district courts in Johnson as noted above on the issue of
whether impermissible discriminatory intent overshadowed the enact-
ment of Florida's 1868 constitutional provision, the Eleventh Circuit
has since ruled in April 2005 that "Florida's felon disenfranchisement
provision is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the
standard the court adopted in Hunter."91 The court reasoned that the
Johnson case is similar to Cotton v. Fordice in that the 1968 reenact-
ment of Florida's felony disenfranchisement provision "eliminated any
taint from the allegedly discriminatory 1868 provision."92
V. CONCLUSION
It cannot be overstated that all of the cases addressing disen-
franchisement have an effect upon one another in some fashion. The
impact of the Johnson case, when taken in its entirety, is undoubtedly
that voting is a fundamental right deserving legal protection, and that
any infringement upon it must be accompanied by a compelling state
interest devoid of impermissible racial intent. The time for serious de-
liberation has come for modern society to reflect upon the ideology and
morality of true democracy. Although straining, the appellate court's
reversal of Johnson in 2004 reminds America of her promises made to
all citizens in the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, policymakers, le-
gal experts and practitioners, and community leaders are becoming in-
creasingly aware of the serious consequences of disenfranchisement
upon the lives of their fellow citizens.
It is critical for modern America to send a consistent message at
home and globally that the United States Constitution is grounded in
equal protection for all its citizens. Perhaps the day is not too remote
when Florida's jurisprudence, and that of the remaining states with
felony disenfranchisement laws, will bring forth a change in treatment
toward felony convicts who deserve to take full advantage of the chance
to rehabilitate and integrate back into the fold of society. Specifically,
for those felony convicts who have "paid their debt to society" by com-
pleting their terms of incarceration, parole or probation, more atten-
tion to honoring those mutual promises inherent within that phrase is
at the forefront of political debate. If modem America and Florida
91. Johnson v. Governor of the State of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1224 (11th Cir. 2005).
92. Id. See supra, note 48.
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policymakers choose to turn a blind eye to dismantling the vestiges of
de jure disenfranchisement, then a mighty train will be permitted to
barrel down the tracks wreaking havoc and shattering lives until ei-
ther an equitable, moralistic stance is taken or until it finally just de-
rails. Most assuredly, turning away in and of itself will lead to mass
destruction. The Plaintiffs in Johnson all had the courage to renounce
past criminal conduct and change their lives in reliance upon the
promise of being reaccepted into the community-it is time for Florida
to follow their example and have the courage to renounce
disenfranchisement.
* **
